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ABSTRACT 
The Chinese statistical authorities have recently adjusted the Chinese GDP level and 
growth rate for the period 1993-2004 following China’s first national economic 
census. However, their methodology used in the adjustment is opaque. Using a trend-
deviation interpolation approach, this study has managed to replicate the basic 
procedures of the adjustment and reproduced the official estimates. Through this 
exercise, it has found that the estimates that could be obtained by the normal 
interpolation procedures were significantly and arbitrarily modified to satisfy certain 
needs. Based on some political economy argument, we attempt to explain why the 
adjustment had to leave the growth rate of 1998 intact and why it had to bypass the 
price issue and directly work on the real growth rate adjustment. Based on previous 
studies and other observations, we also challenge the census results on non-service 
industries.  
  
                                                 
* The earlier version of this paper is presented at the Asian Economic Panel Meeting held at the 
Korea Institute of International Economic Policy, March 20-21, 2006, Seoul. Helpful comments and 
suggestions by Bart van Ark, Ren Ruoen, Huang Yiping, Kim Si Joong and Wing Thye Woo, as well 
as the participants of the meeting are grateful acknowledged. Correspondence could be sent to the 
author via email: afhxwu@inet.polyu.edu.hk. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The long debate about the problem with China’s GDP statistics is in essence not a 
question of accuracy – indeed there is no such thing as perfect national accounts in 
any country that could produce faultless GDP figures, but a question of how 
institutional or methodological problems may cause data fabrication or distortion and, 
more importantly, how institutional constraints may affect the improvement of 
statistical methodology (Wu, 2000 and 2002; Maddison, 1998; Ren, 1997; Woo, 1996; 
Keidel, 1992). These data problems are not only seen in regular statistics (i.e. data 
collected through China’s regular statistical reporting system that was developed 
during the central planning period) but also in surveys and censuses. Without a doubt, 
allocating more public resources to conduct surveys or censuses may improve 
statistical coverage, hence increase the accuracy of statistics, but it alone will not be 
the solution to the data problems. On December 31, 2004, China conducted its first 
National Economic Census that covered all nonagricultural (secondary and tertiary) 
activities, which totally mobilized 13 million personnel with an input of nearly two 
billion yuan (People’s Daily Online, December 22, 2005). Yet, the newly released 
GDP estimates are not less questionable than what we had before.  
On December 20, 2005, after about one year’s work on the census data, China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) announced that the census-based GDP estimate 
for 2004 was 15,988 billion RMB. This raises the nominal GDP level in 2004 by 
2,300 billion RMB or 16.8% compared with the original figures based on the regular 
statistics (13,688 billion) (Table 1). Of this upward adjustment, 92.6 percent is 
attributed to, which appears to support NBS’s long concern about the under-coverage 
problem in the accounting of value added by services (see Xu, 2002; Yue and Zhang, 
2005), and 10.4 to industry (by the Chinese standard of industrial classification, 
including mining, manufacturing and utilities, i.e. II (M) in Table 1), which seems 
surprisingly small given the problems found in the Chinese industrial statistics (to be 
discussed). There is also a 0.8 percent upward adjustment that is attributed to 
agriculture, which does not seem to fit into this nonagricultural activity-focused 
census. However, the above adjustments have resulted in a positive 3.8 percent 
discrepancy (i.e. 92.6%+10.4%+0.8%=103.8%), or 88 billion yuan, that has to be 
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“made up” by an unexpected downward adjustment for construction output (Panel E, 
II (C), Table 1).  
On January 9, 2006, NBS released its annual adjustment to China’s nominal GDP 
level and real growth rate for the period 1993-2004. The pre-1993 period was not 
included in this adjustment because it was previously revised after China’s first 
tertiary census for 1992. Table 1 calculates the effect of the census-based adjustment 
on China’s nominal GDP by major sector by comparing the adjusted output data with 
the original statistics. The adjustment to the value of output in 1992-2004 has raised 
the nominal growth rate from 13.9 to 17.8 per annum for services (III), from 16.3 to 
16.6 for industry (II (M)) and from 11.2 to 11.3 for agriculture (I). As for construction 
(II (C)), it has been lowered from 17.3 to 16.3 percent per annum. As a result, the 
nominal GDP growth rate has been adjusted from 14.6 to 16.1 percent per annum.  
In Table 2, we further compare the adjusted real GDP growth rates and their 
implicit deflators with the original statistics. It appears that NBS has attributed the 
entire upward real output adjustment to services, which raises the real growth rate of 
the service output from 8.6 to 10 percent per annum. As a result, China’s real GDP 
growth rate has been raised from 9.4 to 9.9 percent per annum. Taking into account 
the nominal adjustment as reported in Table 1, the adjustment to the real GDP growth 
implies that the inflation rate over this period has been raised from 4.8 to 5.7 percent 
per annum.  
However, NBS does not explain why the 7.4-percent nominal adjustment that is 
attributed to non-service sectors should be treated as a pure price effect. Strikingly, 
the real GDP growth rate for 1998 remained unadjusted at 7.8%, reflecting the much 
disputed growth performance of the Chinese economy at the height of the Asian 
financial crisis. Figure 1 depicts the impact of the adjustment on the real growth 
performance of China’s service output and total GDP. 
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TABLE 1: CHINA’S NOMINAL GDP LEVEL AND GROWTH RATE: 
ADJUSTED VERSUS ORIGINAL ESTIMATES, 1992-2004  
  Total  I  II (M)  II (C) III  Total  I  II (M)  II (C)  III 
  (a) Adjusted Level (billion yuan)  (d) Adjusted Growth Rate (%) 
1992  2,664 580  1,028 142 914   23.2  9.7  27.2  39.4  26.5 
1993  3,533  689  1,419  227  1,199    32.6 18.7 38.0 60.1 31.2 
1994  4,820  947  1,948  297  1,628    36.4 37.5 37.3 30.8 35.8 
1995  6,079  1,202  2,495  373  2,009    26.1 26.9 28.1 25.8 23.4 
1996  7,118  1,389  2,945  439  2,346    17.1 15.5 18.0 17.6 16.7 
1997  7,897  1,427  3,292  462  2,717   11.0 2.7  11.8 5.4  15.8 
1998  8,440  1,462  3,402  499  3,078    6.9 2.5 3.3 7.9  13.3 
1999  8,968  1,455  3,586  517  3,410    6.2  -0.5 5.4 3.7  10.8 
2000  9,922  1,472  4,003  552  3,894   10.6 1.2  11.6 6.8  14.2 
2001 10,966  1,552  4,358  593  4,463   10.5 5.4 8.9 7.4  14.6 
2002 12,033  1,624  4,743  647  5,020    9.7 4.7 8.8 9.0  12.5 
2003  13,582  1,707  5,495  749  5,632    12.9  5.1 15.8 15.9 12.2 
2004  15,988  2,096  6,521  869  6,502    17.7 22.8 18.7 16.1 15.4 
Average              16.1 11.3 16.6 16.3 17.8 
  (b) Original Level (billion yuan)  (e) Original Growth Rate (%) 
1992  2,664 580  1,028 142 914   23.2  9.7  27.2  39.4  26.5 
1993  3,463  688  1,414  229  1,132    30.0 18.7 37.5 61.5 23.9 
1994  4,676  946  1,936  301  1,493    35.0 37.4 36.9 31.9 31.8 
1995  5,848  1,199  2,472  382  1,795    25.1 26.8 27.7 26.8 20.2 
1996  6,789  1,384  2,908  453  2,043    16.1 15.4 17.7 18.6 13.8 
1997  7,446  1,421  3,241  481  2,303    9.7 2.7  11.4 6.2  12.7 
1998  7,835  1,455  3,339  523  2,517    5.2 2.4 3.0 8.7 9.3 
1999  8,207  1,447  3,509  547  2,704    4.8  -0.5 5.1 4.6 7.4 
2000  8,947  1,463  3,905  589  2,991    9.0 1.1  11.3 7.6  10.6 
2001  9,732  1,541  4,238  638  3,315    8.8 5.4 8.5 8.3  10.9 
2002 10,517  1,612  4,598  701  3,608    8.1 4.6 8.5 9.9 8.8 
2003  11,739  1,693  5,309  818  3,919    11.6  5.0 15.5 16.8  8.6 
2004  13,688  2,077  6,282  957  4,372    16.6 22.7 18.3 17.0 11.6 
Average              14.6 11.2 16.3 17.3 13.9 
  (c) Change of Level (billion yuan) (= a – b)  (f) Change of Growth Rate (%) (= d – e) 
1992  0  0  0  0  0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1993  70  1  4 -2 67   2.6  0.1  0.4  -1.3  7.3 
1994  144  1 12 -5  135   1.4  0.1  0.4  -1.0  3.9 
1995  232  3 23 -9  215   1.1  0.1  0.4  -1.0  3.2 
1996  329  4  37 -14  303    1.0 0.1 0.4  -0.9 2.9 
1997  451  5  51 -19  414    1.3 0.1 0.3  -0.8 3.1 
1998  606  7  63 -25  561    1.7 0.1 0.3  -0.9 4.0 
1999  761  8  77 -30  706    1.5 0.1 0.3  -0.9 3.4 
2000  975  9  99 -37  904    1.6 0.1 0.4  -0.9 3.6 
2001  1,234  10  121 -44  1,147    1.8 0.1 0.3  -0.8 3.7 
2002  1,516  12  146 -54  1,412    1.7 0.1 0.3  -0.9 3.7 
2003  1,843  14  185 -69  1,713    1.3 0.1 0.4  -0.9 3.6 
2004  2,300  19  240 -88  2,130    1.1 0.1 0.4  -0.9 3.9 
Average          1.5  0.1  0.4  -0.9  3.8 
Sources:  The adjusted figures are from NBS website (www.stats.gov.cn). The original figures are available 
from China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2005 and other issues).  
Notes:   1) 1992 is used as the initial benchmark that is not included in the adjustment. 2) I = primary, II = 
secondary that includes II (M) (manufacturing, mining, utilities) and II (C) (construction), III = tertiary. 
3) The implicit GDP deflator is expressed as percent change from the previous year. It is derived by the 
definition: P=V/Q, where P is price index, V is value index and Q is volume index. 
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TABLE 2: CHINA’S REAL GDP GROWTH RATES AND IMPLICIT GDP DEFLATORS:  
ADJUSTED VERSUS ORIGINAL ESTIMATES, 1992-2004 
  Total  I  II (M)  II (C) III  Total  I  II (M)  II (C)  III 
  (a) Adjusted Real Growth Rate (%)  (d)  Adjusted Implicit Deflator (%) 
1992  14.2  4.7 21.2 21.0 12.4    7.9  4.7  4.9 15.2 12.5 
1993  14.0  4.7 20.1 18.0 12.1   16.4 13.4 14.9 35.7 17.1 
1994  13.1  4.0 18.9 13.7 11.0   20.6 32.2 15.5 15.1 22.3 
1995  10.9  5.0 14.0 12.4  9.8   13.7 20.9 12.3 11.9 12.4 
1996  10.0 5.1  12.5 8.5 9.4   6.4 9.9 4.9 8.4 6.7 
1997  9.3 3.5  11.3 2.6  10.7   1.5  -0.7 0.4 2.7 4.6 
1998  7.8 3.5 8.9 9.0 8.3    -0.9  -1.0  -5.1  -1.0 4.6 
1999  7.6 2.8 8.5 4.3 9.3    -1.3  -3.2  -2.8  -0.5 1.3 
2000  8.4 2.4 9.8 5.7 9.7   2.1  -1.2 1.7 1.0 4.1 
2001  8.3 2.8 8.7 6.8  10.2   2.1 2.6 0.1 0.6 4.0 
2002  9.1 2.9  10.0 8.8  10.4   0.6 1.7  -1.1 0.2 1.9 
2003  10.0 2.5  12.8  12.1 9.5   2.6 2.5 2.7 3.4 2.5 
2004  10.1 6.3  11.5 8.1  10.0   6.9  15.5 6.4 7.4 5.0 
Average  9.9 3.8  12.2 9.1  10.0   5.7 7.2 4.0 6.6 7.0 
  (b) Original Real Growth Rate (%)  (e) Original Implicit Deflator (%) 
1992  14.2  4.7 21.2 21.0 12.4    7.9  4.7  4.9 15.2 12.5 
1993  13.5  4.7 20.1 18.0 10.7   14.6 13.3 14.5 36.9 11.9 
1994  12.6  4.0 18.9 13.7  9.6   19.9 32.1 15.1 16.0 20.3 
1995  10.5  5.0 14.0 12.4  8.4   13.2 20.8 12.0 12.8 10.9 
1996  9.6 5.1  12.5 8.5 7.9   5.9 9.8 4.6 9.3 5.5 
1997  8.8 3.5  11.3 2.6 9.1   0.8  -0.8 0.1 3.5 3.3 
1998  7.8 3.5 8.9 9.0 8.3    -2.4  -1.1  -5.4  -0.2 0.9 
1999  7.1 2.8 8.5 4.3 7.7    -2.2  -3.3  -3.1 0.3  -0.3 
2000  8.0 2.4 9.8 5.7 8.1   0.9  -1.3 1.4 1.8 2.3 
2001  7.5 2.8 8.7 6.8 8.4   1.2 2.5  -0.2 1.4 2.3 
2002  8.3 2.9  10.0 8.8 8.7    -0.2 1.6  -1.4 1.0 0.1 
2003  9.5 2.5  12.8  12.1 7.8   1.9 2.5 2.4 4.2 0.8 
2004  9.5 6.3  11.5 8.1 8.3   6.5  15.4 6.1 8.2 3.0 
Average  9.4 3.8  12.2 9.1 8.6   4.8 7.2 3.6 7.5 4.9 
  (c) Change of Real Growth Rate (%) (= a – b)  (f) Change of Implicit Deflator (%) (= d – e) 
1992  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1993  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4   1.8 0.1 0.4  -1.1 5.1 
1994  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4   0.7 0.1 0.4  -0.9 2.0 
1995  0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4   0.6 0.1 0.4  -0.9 1.5 
1996  0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5   0.5 0.1 0.3  -0.9 1.2 
1997  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6   0.7 0.1 0.3  -0.8 1.3 
1998  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   1.5 0.1 0.3  -0.8 3.7 
1999  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6   0.9 0.1 0.3  -0.8 1.6 
2000  0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6   1.1 0.1 0.3  -0.8 1.8 
2001  0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8   0.9 0.1 0.3  -0.8 1.7 
2002  0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7   0.8 0.1 0.3  -0.8 1.8 
2003  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7   0.7 0.1 0.3  -0.8 1.7 
2004  0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7   0.4 0.1 0.3  -0.9 1.9 
Average  0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5   0.9 0.1 0.3  -0.9 2.1 
Sources and Notes:  See Table 1.  
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FIGURE 1: GROWTH PERFORMANCE OF CHINA’S REAL GDP: 
ADJUSTED VERSUS ORIGINAL ESTIMATES 




































































































































Source: Table 1.  
 
In this paper we intend to raise some important questions about NBS’s 2004 
Census-based GDP adjustment and explore their likely implications for China’s real 
GDP performance. Our first inquiry is about the methodology that was used by NBS 
in the adjustment. Based on the information about the approach of adjustment released 
by NBS, we will try to duplicate what NBS did in the adjustment to see whether there 
was any arbitrary adjustment that might aim to meet certain policy target or to fit into 
certain policy framework.  
Our second inquiry focuses on the underlying price problem. This type of census 
by nature cannot obtain information on price changes. Even if the 1992 benchmark 
could be assumed problem-free and thus the under-coverage problem is entirely due 
to new services and products that emerged after 1992, the Chinese statistical 
authorities still face complicated price problems. Since the prices of new services and 
products are usually high at earlier stages and decline quickly throughout the stages of 
maturing, it is apparently very difficult to make sensible assumptions for price 
changes in the adjustment. Furthermore, leaving the real GDP growth rate for 1998 
completely unadjusted suggests that the output level adjustment for this year is a pure 
price effect, which appears to be rather incoherent in this what supposed to be 
systematic adjustment overtime and hence casts serious doubt on the credibility of the 
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adjustment. Our question about these underlying price problems can be illustrated by 
Figure 1. Users of the Chinese GDP estimates would naturally expect an explanation 
about the assumptions that were used for price changes across individual sectors that 
could warrant the real output adjustment. 
Last but not least, it is difficult to accept the findings of the 2004 census that the 
regular statistics for manufacturing and mining industries are basically free from 
problems. How could we fit such findings into numerous disclosures of data 
fabrications in industrial output made by local officials, SOE managers and even 
private firms with different incentives? In fact, it has been reported that data 
fabrication to exaggerate local performance could even be more serious in a national 
event like census than in the regular reporting exercises. Taking into account these 
possibilities, in the conclusion we would like to propose some conjectures about the 
likely real GDP performance over this period. 
2. THE BASIC APPROACH USED IN THE ADJUSTMENT 
To the best of our understanding of the brief explanation in the official announcement 
(NBS, 2006), the basic approach used by NBS in the 2004 Census-based adjustment 
of GDP estimates contains three major steps:  
Step 1: Deriving a “historical trend” using the GDP estimates for 1992 and 2004 
that are based on the regular statistics and then calculate the simple deviation of the 
actual value from the derived trend value for each year. 
Step 2: Drawing a “new trend” for the same period using the same GDP estimates 
for 1992 (as in Step 1) and the 2004 census-based GDP estimates, this generates a 
new trend value for each year. 
Step 3: Interpolating the value for each year between the two benchmarks of the 
new trend by adjusting the trend value by the deviation obtained in Step 1 based on 
the historical data.  
This approach may be best described as one following the trend-deviation 
interpolation method often used by national accounts statisticians. Based on what is 
explained by NBS and the standard procedures of the trend-deviation method,
1 we 
                                                 
1 See an introduction to the procedures by Derek Blades, the former Chief of National Accounts at 
OECD, prepared for the NBS/Asian Development Bank Workshop of “Improving Service Statistics” in 
Shanghai in November 2004.  
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have managed to repeat the likely procedures used in NBS’s recent national accounts 
adjustment. Our findings show that although NBS in principle adopted the standard 
procedures in adjusting the nominal GDP according to the new census, they allowed 
irregularities or arbitrary modifications in the exercise that might be purposely 
introduced to meet certain growth targets. In what follows, we will firstly present the 
standard procedures of the trend-deviation method, secondly adjust the nominal GDP 
using this method, and finally compare our results with the NBS estimates and discuss 
their implications.  
Strictly speaking, the trend-deviation interpolation method requires an indicator (I) 
that is highly correlated with the variable (X) to be estimated. The indicator is an 
existing time series, while the variable to be estimated has only two benchmark values 
based on surveys or censuses. The indicator is used to obtain the deviation of its 
actual value from its trend value (i.e. trend-deviation ratio) for every time point of the 
period concerned. By applying the indicator’s trend-deviation ratio to the variable to 
be estimated, it allows the annual movement pattern of the variable to follow that of 
the indicator.  
Firstly, let us assume that both I and X generally follow an exponential trend, then 
we could estimate their trend growth rates over a given period n, beginning from the 





























Secondly, we could use the estimated growth rate of the trend to calculate the 
trend value at time t over this period for I and X, respectively:  
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t r X X ) 1 ( 0 + =
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Finally, the X series over the period could be estimated by multiplying the trend 
value of X by a parameter D based on the indicator I: 




t t X D X =
where  , i.e. the deviation of the actual value of the indicator I from 






t I I D / =
In the current China case, the indicator is the historical GDP series that is based 
on the NBS regular statistics rather than any other non-GDP indicator that is closely 
associated with the variation of GDP. Precisely, the adjusted GDP series is obtained 
by adjusting the new (adjusted) GDP trend values based on the 1992 and 2004 
censuses by the deviations derived from the historical GDP series (original), that is,  






t GDP D GDP
, =
where , the deviation of the actual value from the 
trend value estimated based on the NBS regular statistics. One of the most obvious 
merits of this interpolation method is to make use of all available information in the 
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TABLE 3: NOMINAL GDP ESTIMATES BY EQUATION 4 AND THEIR COMPARISONS  
WITH THE NBS ADJUSTED ESTIMATES 
(Billion yuan) 
  Results of Interpolation by Eq. (4) 
Nominal Gap  
(=Eq.(4) Estimates – NBS adjusted Estimates) 
  Total  I  II (M)  II (C) III  Total I  II (M) II (C)  III 
1992 2,664  580  1,028  142 914   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
1993 3,505  689  1,419  227 1,170   -28.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 -28.7 
1994 4,787  947  1,948  297 1,595   -33.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -33.0 
1995  6,052 1,202 2,495  373 1,982   -27.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -27.5 
1996  7,104 1,389 2,945  439 2,332   -13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -13.9 
1997  7,898 1,426 3,292  462 2,717   0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0  0.5 
1998  8,432 1,462 3,402  499 3,070   -8.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1  -8.1 
1999  8,966 1,455 3,586  517 3,408   -1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0  -1.4 
2000  9,923 1,472 4,003  552 3,896   1.9 0.0 -0.1 0.0  2.0 
2001 10,967 1,552 4,358  593 4,465   2.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1  1.9 
2002 12,035 1,624 4,743  647 5,021   1.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0  1.7 
2003 13,589 1,707 5,495  749 5,638   6.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1  6.3 
2004 15,988 2,096 6,521  869 6,502   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Sources:   Author’s calculation using Equation (4). NBS adjusted nominal GDP data are from Table 1.  
 
We have produced a new set of estimates using Equation (4) and reported it in the 
left panel of Table 3. In the right panel of the table, we have calculated the nominal 
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value gap between our results and the NBS adjusted estimates to see if the standard 
procedures of the trend-deviation interpolation method were followed by NBS. If the 
standard procedures were strictly followed and no ad hoc adjustments were imposed 
on the results, the expected value of the “nominal gap” should be zero. As shown in 
Table 3, it appears that on the one hand, NBS did adopt the standard procedures of the 
trend-deviation interpolation method as expressed in Equation (4) because our 
Equation (4)-based exercise could produce nearly identical results for all the non-
service sectors to those given by NBS, but on the other hand, our results show that 
NBS indeed introduced some ad hoc modifications to what could be obtained by the 
interpolation as given by Equation (4).  
FIGURE 2: HOW MUCH HAS BEEN ADJUSTED AND HOW CLOSE TO THE STANDARD 
PROCEDURES? 

































































2) NBS Adjusted vs Eq.4-derived Results


































































1) NBS Adjusted vs Original Estimates
(Origianl = 1.000)
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Data are from Table 1. 
 
To intuitively demonstrate this point, in Figure 2 we compare the NBS adjusted 
nominal output with both the NBS original estimates and our Equation (4)-based 
results. The sector and industry codes are defined as those in Table 1, namely primary 
(I), secondary (II) and tertiary (III), with the secondary sector further divided into two 
subgroups, one including manufacturing, mining and utilities and one including 
construction (II (M) and II (C), respectively). In the first panel, in order to highlight 
the effect of the NBS adjusted GDP estimates relative to the original estimates, the 
original estimates are set as the base value (=1.000 for all time points). One could see 
clearly that all sectors are affected by the adjustment, with the tertiary sector affected 
most and positively, followed by the construction industry, but negatively.  
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To see whether the adjustment exactly followed the normal procedures, in the 
second panel, we set the Equation (4)-derived results as the base value (=1). The logic 
is that if the NBS adjustment strictly followed the normal procedures of the 
interpolation method, its results would have completely overlapped with our results, 
i.e. the ratio for all sectors would have been equal to one at all time points. While this 
is basically true for the non-service sectors, it is not the case for the tertiary sector. 
One could see that the NBS results for the tertiary sector drift from the baseline at 
most time points with rather irregular pattern, which confirm that NBS did introduce 
ad hoc adjustments to the results based on Equation (4). Some important questions 
could be raised from this pattern. Especially, if the 1992 benchmark were indeed 
problem-free as assumed by NBS, why should the nominal service output in 1993 as 
obtained by the normal procedures be substantially lifted?  
3. HOW WAS THE REAL GDP GROWTH RATE ADJUSTED? 
To obtain the estimates for the real GDP growth rates, NBS needs proper deflators. 
However, China’s first economic census in 2004 did not include any survey on prices 
(which is not a usual task in this type of census). All output and income data collected 
in the census are stock information at the time of census and in nominal terms. 
Therefore, in the current problem, the price issue is basically independent. Then, what 
assumptions were applied to the price changes of individual sectors that could warrant 
the real GDP adjustment as shown in Figure 1?  
Changes in the implicit GDP deflators of individual sectors (Table 2) can be 
converted into indices based on the 1992 benchmark to demonstrate price changes 
over time. Figure 3 depicts the implicit price changes of services and construction in 
this period as suggested by the original data and the adjusted estimates. We choose the 
two sectors because they were most affected in the adjustment especially in nominal 
terms and in price deflators. Besides, the adjustment has opposite effect on the two 
sectors. Intuitively, the price adjustment seems to be fairly systematic. Compared with 
the original price levels, the adjustment resulted in higher price levels for services and 
lower price levels for construction over the whole period in question. In general, the 
underlying trend has changed substantially in both cases, but the annual pattern of the 
movement remains similar. However, a closer examination shows that in both cases 
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the (implicit) price adjustment to 1998 created an outlier that was not in line with the 
original annual pattern and largely responsible for the slop change of the trend.   
 
FIGURE 3: IMPLICIT GDP DEFLATORS FOR THE TERTIARY AND CONSTRUCTION SECTORS:  
































































































































Source: Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Together with Figure 1 that shows no any adjustment to 1998 in the real GDP 
growth rate, this observation has taken us back to the hot debate in the early 2000s 
about the likelihood of the statistical authorities’ serious data manipulation to 
arbitrarily raise the growth rate for 1998 in order to meet then the government (Zhu 
Rongji Administration)’s growth target when China was badly hit by the Asian 
financial crisis. The official estimate for the real GDP growth rate in 1998 is 7.8 
percent, only 0.2 points lower than the 8 percent growth target, suggesting that the 
target was only missed by a minuscule margin in a very difficult situation. However, 
this growth rate has been challenged by many researchers. They believe that it 
overestimated China’s real growth performance in 1998. For example, based on the 
change of energy consumption for 1997-99, Rawski (2001) suspected that China’s 
real GDP growth in 1998 was at best ranging from -2 to 2 percent. But his estimation 
was criticized by Ren (2002) among others for lacking sound empirical support. Other 
researchers used the expenditure approach (in contrast to the NBS’s value-added 
approach), but arrived at very different results. Keidel (2001) found that the growth 
rate in 1998 could be bounded by 6.9 and 7.2 percent, while Shiau’s recent results 
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showed that it could be somewhere between 2.6 and 4.7 percent (2005). Such 
variations of estimates are largely due to different choices of deflators. There are also 
different views. Using the principal component analysis, Klein and Ozmucur (2002) 
find that the variation of the official GDP growth is well associated with the variation 
of 15 major macroeconomic indicators, suggesting that the official GDP estimates are 
not an outlier. Nevertheless, since the major indicators are from the same official 
sources that generate the information for the GDP estimation, surely no sensible 
inference can be made from their findings in the context of the debate.  
Unfortunately, the infamous “7.8 percent” for 1998 is an important issue that 
NBS could not easily bypass when adjusting China’s GDP growth rate. Apparently, 
NBS faced a big dilemma. On the one hand, it could not systematically raise the 
growth rate of 1998 together with the overall upward adjustment for the whole period 
because that would invite further international criticism. On the other hand, it could 
not take this chance to reasonably make a downward adjustment for 1998 because that 
would indicate that they had admitted the original estimates as a mistake, whose 
implications would be, however, by no means purely technical. Although leaving 
1998 intact in this overall upward adjustment means that the growth rate of 1998 is in 
fact relatively lowered, such an arbitrary treatment has made the whole adjustment 
less credible.  
From the price perspective, the treatment to 1998 also suggests that there were 
some ad hoc modifications in the adjustment. But it is unclear if such modifications 
were made after the nominal GDP estimates were systematically deflated. 
Nevertheless, by assuming that the 1992 benchmark was problem-free, NBS faced 
more complicated price problems. This assumption simply means that the 
undercoverage problem is mainly due to the new products or services that only 
emerged after 1992. Since the growth of new products/services is very price-sensitive, 
their prices are usually high at the early stages and decline quickly throughout the 
stages of maturing. It is therefore almost impossible for NBS to introduce a new trend 
to adjust the original price changes in the absence of necessary price information for 
new products or services. Then, how did NBS solve the price problem in the 
adjustment? Our rather heroic working hypothesis is that NBS did not directly work 
on prices. It is likely that they began with a new GDP growth trend that could satisfy a 
certain growth target for the period in question and then followed the trend-deviation 
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interpolation method to adjust the original annual real growth rates. In other words, 
the new (adjusted) deflators shown in Figure 3 are merely indirect results of the real 
growth rate adjustment rather than actual price changes that are independent of the 
adjustment.  
Then the following questions are: What is the official growth target? How could 
that target affect NBS’s adjustment of growth estimates? Back to the central planning 
era, the “state of art” of the planning administration in China was “leaving room (liu 
you yu di)” for fulfilling annual or five-year plans (FYPs). Since undershooting the 
planned target were politically unacceptable, economic authorities at all levels tended 
to leave enough “room” so that they could easily meet or even exceed their targets. As 
Table 4 shows, there was virtually no target undershooting in any of the FYPs since 
the 1980s.
2 However, it shows that the extent to which the target was exceeded varied 
greatly. This is largely a consequence of a game between lower and upper planning 
authorities. A great excess of the planned target (as seen in the 6
th and 8
th FYPs, Table 
4) often sends a signal to the upper authorities indicating that lower authorities might 
have deliberately left too much “room” in the current plan. Thus, in the next FYP the 
central authorities tend to set a higher growth target to maximally tap the potentials. 
Yet, this may leave little room for overfulfilling the plan. In such a case the plan may 
be just met or marginally overshot (as seen in the 7
th and 9
th FYPs). One could also 
interpret this result as a warning from the lower authorities that if such a high target is 
to be maintained, there may be a good chance to miss it. We could see that a marginal 
excess of the target is often followed by a downward adjustment of the planned target 
in the next FYP (as seen in the 8
th and 10
th FYPs).  
TABLE 4: GROWTH TARGET AND ACTUAL GROWTH ACHIEVED IN  
CHINA’S FIVE-YEAR PLANS (FYPS)   
(In percent) 
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2 This is also the case during the pre-reform period, but it is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Sources:   Information on the growth target of various five-year plans is available from ECACE (various 
annual volumes) and the website of NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) 
(http://ghs.ndrc.gov.cn/). The GDP growth rate for 2005 is 9.9% (as reported by the New China 
News Agent, March 6, 2006), which is used for calculating the average growth rate of the 10
th 
FYP. 
Notes:   a) Calculated as (current target rate/previous target rate – 1)*100. 
b) Calculated as (actual rate/target rate – 1)*100.  
c) Calculated using the recent adjusted growth rates by NBS. 
 
In such a process, changes in national plans can be rather erratic and hence the 
macroeconomic performance tends to be volatile. The situation began to change in the 
early 1990s when the market was allowed to play more important roles in economic 
decisions. Around the mid-1990s, the authorities began to exercise monetary and 
fiscal policies to replace the traditional planning administration, aiming to smooth out 
aggregate volatility. The highly volatile or stop-go macroeconomic performance 
under the Zhao Ziyang’s and Li Peng’s administration from the mid 1980s to the mid 
1990s has taught the later governments some important lessens: the growth should not 
be too fast to maintain necessary macroeconomic balances, especially energy, 
minerals and transportation, but it should be fast enough to create jobs and hence 
reduce the pain of the reform of the state sector. Yet, how fast is just fast enough? The 
leadership’s “rule of thumb” is close to but not more than 10 percent a year. This has 
been seen in discussions of various central governments’ think tanks. For example, 
Liu (1999) described an ideal policy goal as “high growth (9% or below 10%) and 
low inflation (3%)”. This should be, nonetheless, taken as the actual performance not 
the target growth rate. In fact, from Table 4, what we have observed in the game of 
planning is still in place: a lower target that gives enough room to overshoot. But the 
process has become a lot smoother.  
Given this “rule of thumb” and the growth that had already been achieved, there 
was really not much room for NBS to play in the adjustment. On the one hand, NBS 
had to justify its emphasis on services in the census to support its strong belief that the 
service GDP had been indeed underestimated, which must have some positive bearing 
on the overall growth; on the other hand, it might be politically difficult to downward 
adjust the real growth rate of any other sectors (this point will be further discussed). 
NBS might have tried several scenarios in the adjustment, but it looks that an annual 
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growth rate of 9.9 percent was the most acceptable rate for the period 1992-2004.
3 
Since the impact of this upward adjustment on the entire reform period is merely 0.2 
points (up from 9.4 to 9.6), this result may not significantly aggravate international 
critics who have believed that China’s post-reform GDP growth performance has 
already been exaggerated (e.g. Maddison, 1998 and 2006).  
To support our hypothesis, firstly, we would like to see what would be the effect 
on China’s GDP growth rate if NBS just used the original GDP deflators. Or by how 
much it would miss the official target if NBS did so? Our results show that other 
things being equal, if the original NBS price deflators were used, the annual growth 
rate of China’s GDP in 1992-2004 would be 10.8 per annum, further raised by 0.9 
percent from the revised rate of 9.9 percent. This means that if the “rule of thumb” 
target rate was indeed 10 percent or slightly below it, using the original deflator would 
certainly overshoot the target.  
 
FIGURE 4: WHAT IF THE ORIGINAL DEFLATORS WERE USED? 













































































































































Source: Table 1. 
 
Figure 4 shows the effect of the original and the new deflators upon the real 
growth. The newly adjusted NBS nominal total and service GDP data are deflated by 
the two deflators. In fact, the series deflated by the new deflators are the same as those 
                                                 
3 The rate has been rounded up. More precisely it should be 9.87% if we use two decimal points.  
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shown in Figure 1 (the one labeled with “adjusted” in Figure 1), while the series 
deflated by the original deflators are from our calculation.  
The results on annual changes are clearly self-explanatory. If the original price 
deflators were used, firstly, the already over-heated economy in 1993 as suggested by 
the original data would be much worse (more out-of-control growth) than what was 
then admitted by the authorities. Secondly, the Li Peng Administration highly claimed 
“soft landing” in 1996 would become less “soft”: dropping from the peak of 15.8 
percent in 1993 (the time when Zhu Rongji , then the Vice Premier, began to clean up 
the mess of the central bank) to 10.5 percent in 1996 rather than from 14.0 to 10.0 
percent as suggested by the original estimates. Thirdly, the widely criticized 
overstatement for the performance in 1998 when China was badly hit during the Asian 
financial crisis would look even more exaggerated (9.5! instead of 7.8). All these are 
politically difficult to accept. Therefore, in the absence of “satisfactory” deflators, it is 
inevitable for NBS to directly work on the real growth adjustment with some pre-set 
rates that could ensure the government’s “rule of thumb” growth target to be met.  
To investigate the actual procedures adopted by NBS to work out the real GDP 
growth we begin with the new “trend rate” of 9.9 percent (see Equation (1b)) for the 
whole economy in 1992-2004. Then, we use this growth rate to generate a series of 
“trend values” as a 1992-based index (Equation (2b)). Next, we adjust this index by a 
set of deviation parameters obtained from the original real output index also with 
1992 as the benchmark (Equation (4), equivalent to Equation (3)). The same exercise 
is done for every sector. Here, we follow NBS to assume that there is no price effect 
on the output of the non-service sectors (see Panel C, Table 2).  
 
TABLE 5: REAL GDP GROWTH INDEX USING EQUATION (4) AND ITS COMPARISON WITH THE 
ESTIMATES BY NBS  
 
  Equation (4)-derived Growth Index  Growth Index Ratio (NBS Index = 1.000) 
  Total  I  II (M)  II (C) III  Total I  II (M) II (C)  III 
1992  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1993  114.0 104.7 120.1 118.0 112.2   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 
1994  129.0 108.9 142.8 134.2 124.6   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 
1995  143.1 114.3 162.8 150.8 136.9   1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.002 
1996  157.6 120.2 183.1 163.6 149.6   1.002 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 
1997  172.2 124.4 203.8 167.9 165.4   1.002 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1998  186.5 128.7 222.0 183.0 181.6   1.006 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.013 
1999  200.6 132.3 240.8 190.9 198.1   1.006 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.012 
2000  217.6 135.5 264.4 201.7 217.1   1.007 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.010 
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2001  235.0 139.3 287.5 215.4 238.4   1.004 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.007 
2002  255.7 143.3 316.2 234.4 262.6   1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.005 
2003  281.2 146.9 356.7 262.8 286.9   1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.002 
2004  309.3 156.2 397.7 284.1 314.9   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sources:   Author’s calculation. See the text for the methodology used.  
 
 
Table 5 reports the results. As expected, our interpolation (based on Equation (4)) 
results are very close to the adjusted real growth rates by NBS (here the NBS figures 
are also converted to 1992-based indices). This can be seen from the comparison of 
two estimates by a ratio with the NBS estimates as the benchmark (=1). This ratio 
confirms that firstly, for all non-service sectors our results exactly replicate what 
reported by NBS; secondly, for services there again observed some ad hoc downward 
modifications made to the results obtained by our interpolation procedures. Logically, 
such modifications effects create what we call “real gaps” that should be compensated 
by opposite price effect, which will be discussed below.  
 
TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF IMPLICIT GDP DEFLATORS: EQUATION (4) RESULTS VERSUS 
THOSE BY NBS 
 Implicit  GDP  Deflator   Deflator Ratio (NBS Index = 1.000)* 
  Total  I  II (M)  II (C) III  Total I  II (M) II (C)  III 
1992  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1993  115.4 113.4 114.9 135.8 114.2   0.992 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.975 
1994  139.4 150.0 132.6 156.2 140.1   0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.978 
1995  158.7 181.3 149.0 174.8 158.5   0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.985 
1996  169.2 199.2 156.3 189.5 170.5   0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993 
1997  172.2 197.7 157.0 194.6 179.7   0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1998  169.7 195.8 149.0 192.5 185.0   0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.984 
1999  167.8 189.6 144.8 191.5 188.2   0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.988 
2000  171.2 187.2 147.2 193.5 196.4   0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.990 
2001  175.2 192.1 147.4 194.6 204.9   0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993 
2002  176.7 195.3 145.9 194.9 209.2   0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 
2003  181.4 200.3 149.8 201.5 215.0   0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 
2004  194.0 231.3 159.4 216.3 226.0   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sources:   Author’s calculation based on Tables 2, 3 and 5.   
 
Next, in Table 6 using our estimates of both the nominal GDP (Table 3) and the 
real growth rates (Table 5), we work out the implicit GDP deflator for individual 
sectors and compare it with the newly adjusted deflators by NBS (Table 2) by a 
“deflator ratio” with the latter as the benchmark. If the ratio differs from one, it 
indicates some “price effect” created by ad hoc modifications to our estimates 
obtained through the normal interpolation procedures as given by Equation (4). We 
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shall call such effect in this context as “price gap”. In the current case, such “price 
gap” should be less than one as we expected. Our results indeed show that it is the 
case for the tertiary sector. We depict both “real gaps” and “price gaps” in Figure 4 
and we expect they should mirror to each other. Apparently, without the introduction 
of “nominal gap” this is not the case. This certainly deserves further investigation. 
Figure 4 shows that the implicit “price effect” of the NBS’s ad hoc modifications 
to the results by the standard procedures does not always “mirror” the degree of the 
modifications to the real growth. Taking 1993 as an example, the real GDP ratio is 0.1 
percent above the benchmark (= (1.001 – 1)*100), but the deflator ratio is 2.5 percent 
below the benchmark (= (0.975 – 1)*100). How could this be explained? In fact, what 
are missing here are the NBS ad hoc modifications to the nominal values that we 
discovered earlier (Table 3). The implicit “price effect” should have also included the 
“nominal gap” created by the ad hoc modifications to the nominal estimates obtained 
by the standard interpolation procedures.  
 
FIGURE 5: HOW MUCH HAS BEEN ARBITRARILY ADJUSTED AS SUGGESTED BY EQUATION 4?  
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Source: Based on data from Tables 3, 5 and 6. 
 
In fact, Figure 5 demonstrates what arbitrary modifications that NBS had to make 
in order to arrive at their desired growth rates. With the NBS adjusted real growth set 
as the benchmark (=1), no doubt that our lower deflators compared with that of NBS 
(<1) for the non-census points (i.e. years other than 1992 and 2004) are reflected by 
our higher real growth rates compared with those of NBS (>1). However, the “mirror 
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effect” only appears since 1997. For the period prior to 1997, the implicit price effect 
also captures the effect of the higher NBS new nominal estimates compared with what 
we could obtain by the standard approach. By incorporating the “nominal gaps” we 
could construct the full picture of the ad hoc modifications to the tertiary sector with 
the “mirror effect” for the whole period. For the total GDP, the “mirror effect” is 
virtually not that perfect due to the adjustment to other sectors. 
4. WHAT IF ANY OF THE TWO BENCHMARKS IS UNRELIABLE? 
So far we have not challenged any of the two benchmarks set by the census results for 
1992 or 2004 used by NBS in the adjustment. Apparently, the adjustment based on the 
deviation of the old trend from the new one is acceptable only if the new trend is 
accurate. This adjustment improperly assumes that the estimates based on the 1992 
tertiary census are accurate, which is opposite to the belief of many NBS statisticians 
that some “important services” were not covered or at least not sufficiently covered 
both in 1992 and afterwards. One may argue that in an extreme case, if the degree of 
the undercoverage or underreporting was more or less the same back in 1992, there is 
no justifiable reason for adjusting the real growth rate. However, as many may argue, 
with continuous efforts made by NBS over the past decade to improve its statistical 
work including statistical coverage, the undercoverage problem might have been 
improved overtime, therefore the growth rate should be adjusted downward rather 
than upward. 
Our next question is whether the 2004 census results are reliable. There are a 
number of important problems observed in the regular statistics were addressed in the 
census, which further substantiate our skepticism. The first problem is the serious 
discrepancy between local and national accounts. China’s regional GDP estimates 
have been persistently higher than national estimates, which is largely driven by the 
political incentives of localities. As disclosed by Li Deshui, the former Head of NBS, 
at the 2005 CPPCC in Beijing, if regional estimates were used instead, China’s GDP 
in 2004 would be 2658 billion more and its growth rate would be 3.9 percentage 
points higher than the NBS figures estimated based on the information through its 
regular reporting system (reported by a Chinese newspaper Southern City Herald, 
March 8, 2005). Ironically, this 2658 billion yuan of likely data inflation is 
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coincidently close to the 2300 billion of underestimation discovered by the 2004 
census.  
Li’s point was made just after the 2004 census or at the early stage of the work on 
the census data including crosschecking, but why eventually there is no any 
information on how serious the over-reporting problem by localities as discovered in 
this census. As the serious discrepancy between regional and national GDP accounts 
has been hanging there for over a decade, it is very reasonable to assume that NBS 
would have taken this census as a good opportunity to investigate the likely causes of 
the discrepancy. Nevertheless, the adjustment by NBS appears to assume that the only 
possible problem of China’s GDP estimation has been the underestimation of service 
output. 
Further more, it is difficult to accept that other sectors are problem-free. The 
“regular reporting system” has been widely criticized for misreporting not only for 
services but also for manufacturing industries and one of the main purposes of the 
national economic census in 2004 is to compensate for the deficiencies of that system. 
According to Xu (2002), NBS has to downward adjust rural industrial output since the 
1990s after they discovered in the 1995 industrial census that 40 percent of the rural 
industrial output was overstated. In fact, some very serious data fabrication cases were 
found even during the 2004 Census,
4 suggesting that over-reporting of manufacturing 
output at or below township level could be a big problem. Why at the end didn’t the 
census discover any significant output overestimation in industries? 
In Figure 6, I report the preliminary update of my physical output-based 
estimation for China’s industrial growth that challenges the official estimates (Wu, 
2002). It extends my previous estimates from 1997 to 2002. It shows that over the 
period 1978-2002 China’s industrial growth was 16.2 percent per annum compared 
with the official figure of 20.4 percent per annum. My estimates also suggest negative 
industrial growth in 1996 (-3.2 percent, at the time when the authorities claimed a 
“soft landing”) and 1998 (-7.1 percent), which is in line with overall macroeconomic 
performance in China and the situation in the world economy especially the Asian 
                                                 
4 For example, one of the serious data fabrication cases disclosed is that the authorities of Maiwang 
Town, Hubei Province, assigned village officials with “income quotas” which were supposed to be 
filled into the census questionnaires. As a result, 80 million yuan business income by private firms was 
blown up to 1009 million, or 12.6 times the actual value that was discovered by a NBS taskforce after 
an anonymous informant reported to the census authorities (Southern Weekly, 2 June, 2005). One may 
reasonably wonder if this case is only the tip of iceberg. 
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financial crisis. In addition, the figure demonstrates that the official series of annual 
growth since the early 1990s is less volatile than my series, suggesting that the actual 
volatility in industrial production might have been smoothed out.  
 
FIGURE 6: OFFICIAL ESTIMATES MAY HAVE EXAGGERATED CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
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Source:  Author’s preliminary estimates that update his results published in Review of Income and 
Wealth, 48:2 (2002). 
 
5. A CONCLUDING REMARK 
The census is unquestionably one of the statistical authorities’ serious efforts to 
improve the Chinese national accounts. Yet, the legacies of the traditional system and 
political constraints have limited its effect. In this study we have played a detective 
role in an attempt to find out how the recent adjustment was made. There are still a lot 
of problems ahead before we could arrive at more solid conclusion about the real 
growth performance of the Chinese economy. In this final remark, we could only 
touch the always tempting question, “How fast has the Chinese economy grown?” by 
quoting Angus Maddison (2006)’s recent update of his estimate for China’s GDP 
growth.  
Maddison incorporates his work on agriculture and services with my work on 
industrial output including the above cited preliminary update to my earlier estimates 
of China’s industrial growth. By converting the nominal values into the 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars, Maddison shows that China grew at 7.9 percent 
per annum in the period 1990-2003 (a period largely overlapping with the period in 
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our current case) that could be compared with the official rate of 9.9 percent per 
annum. He has not taken into account NBS’s recent upward adjustment by 0.5 percent. 
If we can accept the NBS’s adjustment, Maddison’s estimate will be raised to 8.4 
percent per annum. Although this is still 1.5 percentage points below the official 
growth rate, it is a rate that could quadruple the Chinese economy in less than 18 
years, which means that it easily overshoots Deng Xiaoping’s and his successors’ 
growth targets. However, if the growth rate estimated by Maddison is closer to the 
reality than the official growth rate, it will seriously challenge any exiting growth 
accounting results if the current measure of input growth is acceptable.   
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